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BOOK REVIEW
Organizing the Presidency. STEPHEN HESS. Washington, D.C.: The
Brookings Institution. 1976. Pp. ix, 228, $10.95 hardcover,
$3.95 paper.
As a candidate, the would-be President reaches out for con-
stituents and constituencies, defining his goals and demonstrat-
ing his ability to reconcile competing goals. He exhibits his honor-
able scars-and points out his opponent's less honorable ones.
Throughout the campaign he speaks in the subjunctive, or at best
in the future indicative. But once he is successful, there eventually
comes a time when he must make things happen. He must not only
choose, but he must impose his choices on the body politic; he must
make those choices in the face of his responsibility to carry them
out, as nearly as he can.
Of all the sets of difficulties that a President and a presidential
candidate have to confront, this set is probably the most complex.
This is so primarily because the President is at such an extraordi-
nary distance from those who will actually execute his policies-or
distort or frustrate them-by quite specific actions. In fact, the
Chief Executive does not execute anything. He may be dealing
with a cabinet officer who deals with a bureau chief who deals with
a division chief who deals with a section chief who deals with a
branch chief who deals with an individual who may (or may not)
make something happen, approximately consistent with the origi-
nal instruction.
But even this description is vastly oversimplified. The over-
whelming majority of government decisions are initiated at the
lower levels of the system; that is, most decisionmaking is intersti-
tial. The effectiveness of the decision will depend much of the time
on the integration of a number of parallel or related decisions in
other parts of the bureaucracy, without the intervention of high-
level officialdom. Only a minute proportion of even high-level con-
flicts across the hierarchy can be treated as "Presidential," in that
they merit the personal attention of the President. But somehow
the President must superimpose on this closely woven fabric of
day-to-day decisionmaking the overall pattern of his own decisions
and his own policies, within all the constraints that shape that
pattern.
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In attempting to meet his responsibilities, a President encoun-
ters two kinds of difficulties, no matter how broad his powers of
comprehension, and how unflagging his energies. He cannot by
himself collect and retain enough information to decide where to
intervene, and he cannot by himself prepare and transmit enough
instructions (including follow-up and amendatory instructions) to
assure that his interventions are effective. Thus he needs addi-
tional eyes and ears, and additional arms and legs.
But his helpers create new difficulties for him. If he relies on
too many additional eyes and ears, each pair will reflect only a very
partial vision of the world. If he relies on too many additional arms
and legs, each set will tend to become enmeshed in the particular
set of operations that it is expediting-and he will have more trou-
ble keeping track of them. And if he uses different groups of
individuals as eyes and ears and as arms and legs, the first group
will lack the perspective that comes from responsibility, while the
second group will lack the judgment that comes from objectivity.
The question immediately arises, why can't the President sim-
ply rely on his immediate line subordinates-his cabinet officers
and independent agency heads? Of course he does rely on them
very heavily to execute his policies, and properly so. But more and
more critical decisions cut across established agency lines. The
military budget is first formulated in the Defense Department, but
it also involves the Department of State, and the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, not to mention the Council of Economic
Advisers, as well as all the other departments'and agencies that are
competing for scarce funds. Farm subsidies have been and still are
primarily the concern of the Department of Agriculture, but they
are also a major concern of the Departments of State and Trea-
sury. And job training programs may be a battleground between
the Labor Department and the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare.
As an alternative to relying on line subordinates, the Presi-
dent can turn to his Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to
allocate resources and to assign or reassign responsibilities. But
management decisions are riot in fact separable from policy deci-
sions, and budgets are bottom-line statements of policy-preferences
and priorities. Unless OMB can maintain a highly empathetic rela-
tionship with the President, it cannot fully reflect his views. Main-
taining that relationship requires almost constant contact between
the President and OMB in the process of turning policies into
priorities and then into budgetary decisions. It is essentially an
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iterative process in which needs are totalled, and successive reduc-
tions in the total are apportioned among its components. And it
absorbs an enormous amount of the President's time and energy.
Given all these difficulties, a President can simply withdraw
into the relatively passive role of judge rather than leader. He can
establish the political equivalent of the judicial requirement of a
case or controversy, and insist that the parties in interest within his
Administration take the initiative in bringing their unresolved dis-
putes to him. The danger, of course, is that most disputants will
choose to stay out of court, and instead resolve their disputes by
splitting the difference proportionately to their relative power posi-
tions. That makes for a quiet life for everyone, at least in the short
run, but it also makes hash of the President's program, even in the
short run.
When two or more agency heads agree that they want to take
their differences to the Oval Office, someone has to decide wheth-
er the controversy merits presidential attention. It is an appropri-
ate and manageable job for the President's staff to filter out those
controversies that are not in fact "Presidential," and to send the
antagonists back to reconcile their differences among themselves.
The gatekeeper function is a legitimate staff function, although it
must of course be subject to an ultimate right of appeal from the
presidential assistant to the President. himself. But exercising that
right of appeal means using up precious capital, and everyone
involved knows it.
The more difficult problem arises when the parties are disin-
clined to bring their disagreement to the White House, although
that is where it ought to be settled in order to effectuate the pol-
icies of the President. White House staff may be able to encourage
an appeal, but they cannot compel it without severely damaging
their relationships with line officials-particularly if they find that
what they believe to be the President's policies are being frustrated
by a line official overruling one of his own subordinates. For a
presidential assistant to raise an issue that an agency head doesn't
wish to have raised is really to interfere in management. And it is
an interference for which the right of appeal to the President of-
fers no real remedy. There is an enormous difference between a
presidential assistant saying to an agency head, "I don't think this
matter is ripe for the President's attention," and saying "I want to
take this to the President, even though you are satisfied to handle it
yourself."
Another way for the President to surface issues that could
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stymie his program is for him to appoint an interagency task force,
designating the head of one of the component agencies as chair-
person, with executive powers. That individual, then, is in effect
delegated the powers of the President with respect to a subject
matter that cuts across several departments and agencies; he has
direct access to the resources of all the relevant parts of govern-
ment. The selection of the chair will necessarily bias the task force
in the direction of that person's primary responsibilities, and may
create some direct conflicts of interest. But by the same token those
responsibilities will lend authority to the execution of the task at
hand. By designating the head of an executive agency as the chief
executive officer of the task force, the President can emphasize his
intention that the task force should take his policy and make it
happen, in the face of whatever practical obstacles it might en-
counter. He is effectively saying to the task force and to its leader:
"I expect you to move ahead from where we are now." But he must
at the same time give that leader sufficient access to himself so that
he will not be told too late: "You can't get there from here."
Another instrument available to the President is the panel of
outside advisers. It is clearly not an implementation device, but
perhaps equally important, it is one of the best ways for a President
to find out that he can't achieve a goal he has set for himself and
for the country, at least by the means or schedule that he has
chosen. The Wise Men convened by Lyndon Johnson before the
turnaround in his Vietnam policy constituted such a group. Even
Wise Men have their biases, of course, but at least they may fall
somewhere outside the structure of biases within the Administra-
tion-unless a President selects them only to reinforce his own
biases.
A President can accomplish nothing, or virtually nothing,
without the cooperation of the legislative branch, and much, if not
most, of his time is spent in attempting to persuade the legislative
leadership and individual legislators to fall in with his plans and
programs--or to accept reasonable compromises. Again, depend-
ing on the level of detail and the extent to which the particular
problem fits the way in which the Executive Branch happens to be
organized, he can delegate some of these responsibilities to agency
heads and to members of the White House staff.
Lastly, in a federal system, a President works directly with
other levels of government-governors, mayors, and local political
leaders-to accomplish his objectives by persuasion, by the astute
distribution of benefits, and even occasionally by threats. He also
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works with business and labor leaders, and such a large number of
diverse special interest groups that he has to rely on White House
staff, agency heads, and others down the line in the bureaucracy to
maintain his contacts and to accomplish his objectives.
This quick sketch of the various ways in which the President
can make things happen within the government and in the country
suggests that he must work through many different and overlap-
ping lines of authority, persuasion, and oversight, and that he can-
not rely either on his own staff in the White House or on his line
officers in the departments and agencies to divide up their helping
roles in any formal fashion. Indeed the division between line and
staff is applicable only in the most general way.
The "line-ness" or "staff-ness" of a particular position varies
with the times and with the character of the incumbent in the
position. Both line and staff officers need to have some reasonable
expectation of what will be demanded of them by their President.
A minimum level of predictability helps them to do their jobs with-
out using up too much of the President's time in giving instruc-
tions. But mostly they need to be prepared to live with flexible ad
hoc-ery, to fill in where they are needed, and to pull back where
the President has tapped a different resource. As a general rule,
people whose primary responsibility is to manage resources (i.e.,
agency heads) are better equipped to figure out how to apply those
resources to the particular problems that concern the President,
while people whose primary responsibility is to manage problems
(i.e., White House staff) are better equipped to figure out what
resources should be applied to the problems that concern the Pres-
ident, and to report on how effectively the resources are being
used. But unless the resource manager is regularly exposed to the
world of the problem manager, his own concerns will be limited to
the protection and expansion of the resources he manages. And
unless the problem manager is regularly exposed to the world of
the resource manager, he will lose sight of the severe limitations on
the resources available for problem solving.
In his careful and insightful study of the organization of the
presidency, Stephen Hess touches on all these problems, from a
background of White House experiences recollected in tranquility.
He traces the growth and expansion of the White House staff
through six presidencies, from Roosevelt through Nixon, noting
the interplay between the idiosyncracies of presidential personality
and the imperatives of increasing societal interdependence and
governmental complexity. With characteristic intuition, Hess ob-
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serves that "[w]hile boredom . . . is seldom mentioned in discus-
sions of the presidency, it is a key factor in determining who gets
to see Presidents and how they choose to receive information."'
About the Nixon interlude, he concludes that "[i]n the end, a Greta
Garbo conception of the presidency was unsuited to democratic
leadership, which must depend on keeping in touch with the other
actors in the governing process. '"2 He recognizes that "[t]he President
is the nation's chief political officer. He tries to stay astride a process
that is quintessentially political, and the political process primarily
concerns distribution, not production. It decides who gets how
much of what is available, not how to make more available at less
CoSt."
3
Mr. Hess points up the limits of what organization can do, and
the more stringent limits on what the White House staff can do:
"[It] is not a sufficient fulcrum to move the weight of the federal
establishment."4 He properly rejects a number of simple, or rather
simplistic, solutions to the managerial problem-to choose a Presi-
dent who is a manager rather than a policymaker; to shunt off
essential governmental functions to the states or to the private
sector; to consolidate existing agencies-although he recognizes the
virtues of functional reorganization.
He has his own solution to offer, conveniently capsulized in
one sentence:
The chief conclusion of this study is that effective presiden-
tial leadership in the immediate future is likely to result only
from creating more nearly collegial administrations in which
Presidents rely on their Cabinet officers as the principal sources
of advice and hold them personally accountable-in the British
sense of "the doctrine of ministerial responsibility"-for the op-
erations of the different segments of government. 5
His proposition is further spelled out with a number of specific
suggestions to improve the functioning of the Cabinet-e.g., recon-
stituting its makeup, limiting its size, and providing an adequate
secretariat.
But this solution still seems inadequate. The President can
share some kinds of problems with his Cabinet, others with his
IP. 213.
2P. 8.
3 P. 147 (emphasis in original).
4 P. 153.
5 P. 154 (original in italics).
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staff, and still others through a variety of ad hoc arrangements.
There are more problems on earth (let alone in heaven) that a
President must deal with than were ever dreamt of in a Cabinet
secretary's philosophy.
Cabinet officers cannot help being more concerned with the
operations of their departments than with any other aspect of gov-
ernment. In fiscal year 1975 even the smallest domestic cabinet
department, the Department of Commerce, had a budget of $1.6
billion and a work force of 36,000 employees. 6 The average de-
partmental budget during the same year was $26 billion, and the
average work force was over 300,000. 7 It is not so much that cab-
inet officers cannot see the forest for the trees-although they
may have some difficulty in seeing beyond the horizons of their
own departments. It is rather that their occupational bias leads
them to focus on what government institutions can do, more than
on what citizens need from government. They see the forest of
government agencies, with budgets and tables of organization and
programs-and problems-more vividly than they see the forest of
private institutions and individuals with needs and hopes and
aspirations-and problems. Of course, there will be individual
cabinet officers who do not fit this pattern. But the longer they are
on the job the more they are likely to be forced into it. Even for the
most farsighted manager, the institution that he manages and its
parallel institutions in society are bound to be more real than the
universe those institutions serve.
Mr. Hess suggests an analogy to the British Cabinet,8 but that
analogy is a distant one, both because the members of the British
Cabinet are elected politicians, serving in the legislative branch,
and because the British civil service extends up through a level of
management in each department, which our civil service does not
even attempt to reach. Whether we would have been better off if
we had adopted the British parliamentary system is a debatable
question. But at any rate, we are not about to change our institu-
tions for a different set.
A restructured cabinet, organized and regularly reorganized
around the most important functions of the federal government
today, and avoiding, so far as possible, the perpetuation of client-
6 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 228, 243
(1975).
7Id.
8 See, e.g., p. 209.
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oriented agencies, might ease some of the President's burdens. But
neither the Cabinet nor the White House staff nor the component
agencies of the Executive Office of the President can be the chosen
instrument of presidential power. Each component must be re-
strained from its natural tendency toward expansion in size and
power, and each must be reined in by the President, exercising his
managerial and political talents in playing them off against each
other. Only thus can he preserve the genius of the Presidential
system.
Adam Yarmolinsky*
* Ralph Waldo Emerson Professor, University of Massachusetts. A.B. 1943, Harvard
University; LL.B. 1948, Yale University. The author served in several posts in the Kennedy
and Johnson Administrations.
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